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Recent Developments
European Criminal Justice Integration 5.0: Towards a European Public
Prosecutor's Office. By Johanna Goehlerf
Each year, the European Union loses approximately E3 billion due to
fraud.' National law enforcement authorities, although exclusively competent
to prosecute offences against the EU's budget, do not sufficiently intervene.2 In
times of economic crisis and declining citizen trust, the EU is no longer
prepared to accept this waste of taxpayer money, and has recently proposed
what has become the most controversial issue in EU criminal justice policy: the
establishment of a European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO).
I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF A EUROPEAN PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
Currently, the administration of criminal justice within the EU is
exclusively a task for the member states. EU involvement in criminal matters is
limited to facilitating cooperation between the nation states, primarily through
enhancing mutual recognition of judicial decisions, and secondarily through
harmonizing specific areas of national criminal law. European law enforcement
authorities and European criminal law sensu stricto do not yet exist. The EPPO
would be the first supranational authority competent to prosecute crimes
against the EU's financial interests throughout the EU.3  Thus, the
implementation of an EPPO would signal a paradigm shift. For the first time,
the EU would take on direct responsibility for the protection of its financial
interests, combat insufficient prosecution priorities of the member states, and
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1. Commission Impact Assessment Accompanying the Proposal for a Council Regulation on
the Establishment of the European Public Prosecutor's Office, at 7, SWD (2013) 274 final (July 17,
2013).
2. See id. at 6-7 (noting that "the rate of successful prosecutions ... varies considerably
across the EU"); Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Establishment of the European Public
Prosecutor's Office, at 2, COM (2013) 534 final (July 17, 2013) [hereinafter Proposal] (noting that
"Member States' criminal investigation and prosecution authorities are currently unable to achieve an
equivalent level of protection and enforcement").
3. The currently existing EU bodies Eurojust, Europol, and the European Anti-Fraud Office
only coordinate national prosecution measures, but lack their own enforcement powers. See Christine
van den Wyngaert, Eurojust and the European Public Prosecutor in the Corpus Juris Model: Water and
Fire?, in EUROPE's AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY, AND JUSTICE 201, 206, 215 (Neil Walker ed., 2004).
In addition to the proposed authority, the European Council may also extend the EPPO's prosecutorial
power to include serious crimes having cross-border dimensions. See Consolidated Version of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 86(4), Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 0. J. (C 83/47)
[hereinafter TFEU]. This expanded mandate would differ substantially from the current authority to
prosecute financial crimes against the EU. See Marianne Wade, A European Public Prosecutor:
Potential and Pitfalls, 59 CRiME L. SOC. CHANGE 439, 441-43 (2013).
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offer a progressive answer to cross-border challenges in an open-border
environment.
The proposal's reformative and controversial character is indicated by its
long history of evolution. By the 1990s, scholars had introduced the idea of a
European public prosecutor;4 and in 2001, the European Commission took it up
in a green paper.5 Yet, only the 2009 reformation of the EU core treaties gave
the EU the actual legal power for its implementation, promoting the vision of a
supranational prosecutor into a realistic possibility.6 With the recent economic
crisis contributing to a favorable political climate, the EU has now finally
initiated the legislative procedure to establish an EPPO.7
II. CHALLENGES IN A MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE SYSTEM
As the EU is pushing for the implementation of an EPPO, certain member
states are concerned that a supranational prosecutor would interfere with
something they regard as a core field of national sovereignty: their
administration of criminal justice. In fact, Denmark, the United Kingdom, and
Ireland have decided not to participate in the EPPO.8 Along similar lines,
parliaments of eleven member states have filed complaints that the current
legislative proposal fails to comply with the EU subsidiarity requirement. 9
While some critics contest the overall need for action, others claim that the EU
should instead strengthen the existing cooperation mechanisms. 10 Such
4. See CORPUS JURIS: PORTANT DISPOSITIONS PItNALES POUR LA PROTECTION DES
INTtRPTS FINANCIERS DE L'UNION EUROPEENE (Mireille Delmas-Marty ed., 1997), arts. 18-24.
5. Commission Green Paper on Criminal-Law Protection of the Financial Interests of the
Community and the Establishment of a European Prosecutor, COM (2001) 715 final (Dec. 11,2001).
6. See TFEU art. 86, supra note 3.
7. The Commission issued the proposal in July 2013, Proposal, supra note 2. The European
Parliament endorsed the proposal, see Resolution on the Proposal for a Council Regulation on the
Establishment of the European Public Prosecutor's Office, COM (2013) 534 (Mar. 12, 2014), and it is
currently under negotiation in the Council of the EU, see Draft Council Regulation on the Establishment
of the European Public Prosecutor's Office, 9834/1/14 REV 1 (Annex) (May 21, 2014) [hereinafter
Draft Council Regulation].
8. Denmark decided up front not to participate in the EPPO under the EU treaties. See
Protocol (No. 22) on the Position of Denmark, art. 1, Oct. 26, 2012, 0. J. (C 326) 299. The United
Kingdom and Ireland have a specific right under the EU treaties to decide if they want to take part in the
adoption of an EPPO. See Protocol (No. 21) on the Position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in
Respect of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, arts. 1(1), 3(1), Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 0. J. (C 326)
295. They opted against it. See Memorandum from the Eur. Pub. Prosecutor's Office: Comm'n Proposal
Gains Momentum (MEMO/14/154) (Mar. 4, 2014) ("The United Kingdom and Ireland decided not to
opt-in under the Treaties and therefore will not participate [in the EPPO] either.").
9. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 5(3), May 9, 2008, 2008 0. J.
(C 115) 18 ("Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive
competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be
sufficiently achieved by the Member States ... but can rather.., be better achieved at Union level.").
Regarding the complaints, see Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council and the National Parliaments on the Review of the Proposal for a Council Regulation on the
Establishment of the European Public Prosecutor's Office with Regard to the Principle of Subsidiarity,
in Accordance with Protocol No 2, COM (2013) 851 final (Nov. 27, 2013) [hereinafter
Communication]. For a discussion on the underlying reasons for the member states' resistance, see
Katalin Ligeti & Michele Simonato, The European Public Prosecutor's Office: Towards a Truly
European Prosecution Service?, 4 NEW J. EUR. CRIM. L. 7, 8-10 (2013).
10. See Communication, supra note 9. For similar critiques among scholars, see, for example,
Michele Caianiello, The Proposal for a Regulation on the Establishment of an European Public
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interventions, these latter critics posit, would infringe less on national
sovereignty and protect the EU budget more efficiently and cost-effectively.
These concerns reflect a widespread skepticism that has confronted the
idea of an EPPO since its inception. Yet, with the recent economic crisis, the
climate has changed. The current political and academic debate centers less on
if the EPPO should exist and has instead shifted to how it should be established.
III. A DECENTRALIZED AND INTEGRATED MODEL
The proposed regulation on the establishment of the EPPO addresses
various questions regarding the functioning of the future office." The rules that
determine the envisioned EPPO's character most are those that govern its
organization and modus operandi.
Regarding organization, the EPPO would be structured as an independent
European institution consisting of a central authority and decentralized system
of European delegated prosecutors. The European delegated prosecutors would
be integrated into national prosecution systems and carry out operational work
on behalf of the EPPO. The central authority would decide strategic matters,
such as the EPPO's prosecution policy, and monitor operational work. 12
Regarding the modus operandi, the EPPO would be competent' 3 to lead
the investigation and prosecution of offenses against the EU's budget in the
member states.14 The pretrial procedure would be governed primarily by the
law of the member state on whose territory an investigation is conducted.' 5 EU
law would only prescribe certain minimum standards;16 the enactment of a
comprehensive European code of criminal procedure is not planned.1 7 Finally,
Prosecutor's Office. Everything Changes, or Nothing Changes?, 21 EUR. J. CRIME CRIM. L. & CRIM.
JUST. 115, 123-25 (2013).
11. Article 86(3) of TFEU outlines topics that the regulation must address, including the
EPPO's structure and rules on procedure, evidence, and judicial review. TFEU art. 86(3).
12. The design of the central authority is highly controversial. While the Commission has
proposed a hierarchical model headed by one chief European prosecutor, the member states prefer a
more complex "college" structure, led by a board representing all member states. This preference is
unsurprising since the college model would make the states more involved in the EPPO. See Draft
Council Regulation, supra note 7, arts. 7-12.
13. The scope of its competence is contentious. Some national ministers who favor
concurrent competence, see Draft Council Regulation, supra note 7, art. 19, object to the Commission's
Proposal's grant of exclusive competence to the EPPO to investigate and prosecute criminal offences
against the EU's financial interests, see Proposal, supra note 2, art. 11(4).
14. Harmonized domestic law would define these offenses. For a detailed discussion of the
substantive law applied by the EPPO see Bettina Weil3er, Strafgesetzgebung durch die Europiische
Union: Nicht nur ein Recht, sondern auch eine Pflicht? [EU Penal Legislation: Not Only a Right, But
Also a Duty?], GOLTDAMMER'S ARCHIV FOR STRAFRECHT 433 (2014) (Ger.).
15. Proposal, supra note 2, art. 11(3).
16. The minimum standards primarily concern investigative measures and procedural
safeguards, see Proposal, supra note 2, arts. 26, 32-35.
17. Scholars have criticized this integrated approach, see, e.g., Anette Grilnewald, Eine
Europdiische Staatsanwaltschaft nach den Vorstellungen der Europdiischen Kommission [A European
Public Prosecutor According to the Ideas of the European Commission], 14 ONLINEZEITSCHRWT FOR
HOCHSTRICHTERLICHE RECHTSPRECHUNG ZUM STRAFRECHT [HRRS] 508, 512-14 (Dec. 2013) (Ger.),
http://www.hrr-strafrecht.de/hrr/archiv/13-12/index.php?sz-7; and instead campaigned for unified
2015]
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the EPPO would bring its cases before domestic criminal courts,'8 applying lex
fori, since the EU treaties do not envisage the creation of a genuine European
criminal court.
This brief introduction to the legislative proposal demonstrates certain
key characteristics of the envisioned EPPO: decentralization, integration with
the national legal systems with prevailing application of domestic law, and
close cooperation with national law enforcement authorities. These
characteristics may be surprising in the context of a supranational authority.'
9
Officially, they are justified as having practical advantages.20 Practically, they
represent the reality that EU legislators must respect the member states'
concerns over forfeiting their sovereignty when deciding on the design of the
EPPO; otherwise, the member states will refuse to participate. The European
Commission's decentralized and integrated approach is intended to mitigate
these national concerns and promote greater support for the proposal among the
member states. Clearly, criminal justice initiatives in the EU multi-level
governance system have to reconcile this tension. Yet the European legislators
will have to tread carefully to ensure that this endeavor does not jeopardize the
efficiency of the future Office or its commitment to due process. Two
amendments are needed to address these perils.
First, the proposed system of judicial review for measures undertaken
by the EPPO needs to be revised. The current proposal suggests entrusting the
member states with the judicial control of the EPPO. Yet this approach would
result in a random variation, and in some instances, complete absence of
judicial review, especially with regard to EPPO's dismissal decisions. To
guarantee an efficient prosecution throughout the EU, a supranational solution
to judicial review on EPPO's dismissal decisions is necessary. 21 Second, in
order to secure equality of arms and due process, EU criminal justice initiatives
will have to strengthen not only transnational prosecution, but equally
transnational defense.22
supranational rules governing the pre-trial procedure, see Katalin Ligeti, Model Rules for the Procedure
of the EPPO, http://eppo-project.eu/design/eppodesign/pdf/converted/index.html?url=f47fc18el39
b7f8f9c04ffd26aI 396.pdf (last visited Dec. 4, 2014).
18. The EPPO would choose the court in compliance with statutory criteria. See Proposal,
supra note 2, art. 27.
19. For scholarly critiques of this proposed structure, see, for example, GrOnewald, supra
note 17, at 515; Caianiello, supra note 10, at 123-25. For a more positive perspective on the initial "low
key compromise" that an EPPO requires from states, see Ligeti & Simonato, supra note 9, at 21.
20. Communication from the Commission, Better Protection of the Union's Financial
Interests: Setting Up the European Public Prosecutor's Ofice and Reforming Eurojust, at 7, COM
(2013) 532 final (July 17, 2013).
21. For details, see Johanna Goehler, To Continue or Not: Who Shall Be in Control of the
European Public Prosecutor's Dismissal Decisions?, 6 NEW J. EUR. CRIM. L. (forthcoming Mar. 2015).
22. For example, by installing an institutionalized defense mechanism at the European Union
level. See European Criminal Policy Initiative, A Manifesto on European Criminal Procedure Law, 8





The ultimate rules for establishing the EPPO remain intensely debated.
Certain provisions still require close scrutiny and revision to guarantee the
creation of a supranational office dedicated to justice and efficiency. Despite
these controversies, the EPPO project is closer to reality than it has ever been
before. An immediate EU-wide implementation would require unanimity in the
Council of the EU. Nevertheless, with the cooperation of at least nine member
states, the EPPO could begin as an enhanced cooperation project.23 Given the
initiative of supportive member states such as Germany and France, the
introduction of enhanced cooperation is very realistic. As such, the EPPO
would start off akin to successful EU projects like the Schengen Agreement,
whose scope of application has since been extended. 24
For EU integration, the implementation of an EPPO would signal a
paradigm shift. The introduction of a supranational prosecutor would
revolutionize criminal prosecution systems that rely on interstate cooperation.
Through this move, the EU would take a step towards creating a truly European
area of criminal justice and taking on a lead role in the European criminal
justice administration.
23. TFEU art. 86(1), supra note 3.
24. The Schengen Agreement between the states of the Benelux Economic Union, Germany,
and France facilitated the creation of a borderless area in Europe. See The Schengen Acquis -
Agreement Between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal
Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at Their Common




The Role of Civil Society Organizations in the United States' Recently-
Concluded CERD Review. By Bradley Silvermant
In recent years, American civil society organizations (CSOs) 1 have taken
on a more active role in monitoring and enforcing America's compliance with a
variety of its obligations under international law. CSOs have engaged in a
human rights monitoring and enforcement strategy to pursue their missions.
CSOs are interacting with a variety of global enforcement monitors to hold the
United States' feet to the fire-spotlighting areas where they believe the United
States has fallen short of its responsibilities to protect and advance social
justice. This Recent Development will examine the United States' recently
concluded Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination
periodic review to illustrate and explore both its mechanics and implications.
In 1994, the United States ratified the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), which obligates
signatories to take affirmative measures to combat racial discrimination. 2 The
Convention established the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination (CERD Committee) to monitor its implementation in signatory
states. 3 As a signatory to the Convention, the United States is obligated to
submit a report every two years "on the legislative, judicial, administrative or
other measures ... [it has] adopted" to promote racial equality.4 Recently, the
United States completed its third periodic review, submitting a report to the
United Nations in June 20135 and appearing before the CERD this past August
in Geneva, Switzerland.6
Under the terms of its ratification, the Convention is not a self-executing
law in this country. 7 Human rights advocates use CERD review to bring
t Yale Law School, J.D., expected 2016; Brown University, A.B. 2013. 1 am gratefully
indebted to Marcia Johnson-Blanco, Meredith Horton, and Rose Clouston for enriching my
understanding of CERD review and the contributions CSOs make to it, and to the editors at the Yale
Journal of International Law.
1. "The increasingly accepted understanding of the term civil society organizations . . . is
that of non-state, not-for-profit, voluntary organizations formed by people in [the] social sphere." Civil
Society, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story006/en/ (last visited Dec. 4,
2014).
2. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
opened for signature Dec. 21. 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4 1969) (ratified by the
United States Oct. 21, 1994) [hereinafter Convention].
3. Id. art. 8.
4. Id. art. 9(l).
5. United States Periodic Report to the Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination,
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (June 12, 2013), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/210817.pdf.
6. See U.S. Delegation to the Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Media
Note, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (Aug. 11, 2014), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/230498.htm.
7. U.S. Reservations, Declarations, and Understandings, International Convention on the
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pressure to bear on the United States to pursue policies to reduce racial
disparities in American society. To that end, CSOs "engage with [CERD] and
its work" in numerous ways before, during, and after formal review sessions:
they participate in the preparation of the government's own reports, lobby at
review sessions, and monitor domestic Convention implementation. 8 CSOs
make their most significant contribution to the review process through the
submission of "shadow reports," which augment and contextualize the United
States' formal reports by detailing areas where the United States allegedly has
failed to meet its Convention obligations, shedding light on "what is actually
happening on a daily basis to communities of color across the U.S." 9 Many
shadow reports seek to bring issues within the ambit of CERD review by tying
a government practice, policy, or inaction to either discriminatory purpose or
effect, 0 both of which are incorporated into the CERD definition of "racialdiscrimination."'11
This cycle, CSOs played a more prominent role in the United States'
CERD review than ever before, contributing dozens of reports on topics
ranging from housing to accessible medical care to the rights of indigenous
peoples. 12 To enhance the efficacy of their presentations, CSOs coordinated
their advocacy efforts through a U.S. Human Rights Network-established
umbrella organization, the CERD Taskforce. This Taskforce was created to
"serve as the primary coordinating body for social justice groups and
individuals interested in using [CERD] to advance racial justice in the United
States."' 3 By serving as a central organizing body and information resource for
CSOs seeking to lever the CERD review process for human rights advocacy,
the Taskforce would "facilitate broad engagement in the [CERD] review
process" and "promote [CSO] participation in civil society and government
consultations." Though a prior Taskforce had played a coordinating role
during the prior CERD review cycle, 15 the 2014 process represented a high-
water mark of CSO engagement with CERD review.
The Taskforce synchronized CSOs' advocacy efforts by "disseminat[ing]
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 140 CONG. REc. S7634-02 (daily ed. June 24,
1994).
8. Daisuke Shirane, ICERD and CERD: A Guide for Civil Society Actors, in
INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT AGAINST ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AND RACISM 24 (2011).
9. ICERD: The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, U.S. HUMAN RTS. NETWORK, http://www.ushmetwork.org/icerd-project (last visited
Dec. 4, 2014) [hereinafter ICERD Resources].
10. See generally Executive Summary of US. Civil Society Shadow Report Submissions, U.S.
HUMAN RTS. NETWORK, http://www.ushrnetwork.org/sites/ushmetwork.org/files/cerdexecutive
summary2014final.pdf (last updated Aug. 7, 2014).
11. Convention, supra note 2, art. 1 1.
12. See generally Executive Summary of U.S. Civil Society Shadow Report Submissions,
supra note 10.
13. CERD Taskforce, U.S. HUMAN RTS. NETWORK, http://www.ushmetwork.org/members
/taskforce/cerd-taskforce (last visited Dec. 4, 2014).
14. Id.




information relevant to the CERD review of the United States" among them. 16
As CSOs worked on their reports, the Taskforce provided a wealth of
background knowledge and educational resources, including information on the
Convention's interaction with domestic civil rights law 17 and applicability to
particular discriminated-against communities. 8 It also "coordinate[d] the
submission of shadow reports and other relevant written responses" by
providing tools and training to assist CSOs with their report writing. The
mechanics of shadow report writing were unfamiliar to the many CSOs that
were participating in the review process for the first time. 19In addition to
producing a template,20 sample reports,2 1 and guidelines on effective writing,
the Taskforce guided CSOs through various aspects of the writing process,
23including identifying organizational expertise and allies.
The Taskforce also coordinated the human rights community's direct
engagement with government officials before and during official proceedings
in August. In the months leading up to its appearance before CERD in Geneva,
the United States repeatedly consulted with CSOs.24 In Geneva, the Taskforce
planned or proposed a schedule of meetings, including a proposed meeting with
U.N. entities such as the Civil Society Unit, Special Rapporteurs, and High
Commissioner of Human Rights.
25
It is too soon to measure the influence that CSOs wielded in CERD
review or to filly ascertain the impacts of their participation. The review
process went virtually unnoticed by American media outlets, which devoted
16. Id.
17. The CERD Treaty and US. Civil Rights Law, U.S. HUMAN RTS. NETWORK (Oct. 2011),
http://www.ushrnetwork.org/sites/ushrnetwork.org/files/ushrnprrac cerd-and-civilrightscomparison
factsheet 0 .pdf.
18. See, e.g., Using the International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial
Discrimination to Hold States Accountable for Racial Discrimination, U.S. HUMAN RTS. NETWORK,
http://www.ushmetwork.org/IITC-CERD-Handout-ENG#sthash.LVVUgICa.dpuf (last visited Dec. 4,
2014).
19. See ICERD Newsletter One: 2008 ICERD Shadow Reports Compilation, U.S. HUMAN
RTS. NETWORK, http://www.ushmetwork.org/news-updates/icerd-newsletter-one-2008-icerd-shadow
-reports-compilation (last visited Dec. 4, 2014).
20. ICERD Suggested Shadow Report Template, U.S. HUMAN RTs. NETWORK,
http://www.ushmetwork.org/resources-media/icerd-suggested-shadow-report-template (last visited Dec.
4,2014).
21. See ICERD Resources, supra note 9. See, e.g., Written Statement on Deportations to
Haiti, U.S. HUMAN RTS. NETWORK (2013), http://www.ushmetwork.org/sites/ushmetwork.org/files
/21_page_293-299_deportations to haiti miami-law.pdf.
22. 10 Steps to Writing a UPR Stakeholder Report, U.S. HUMAN RTS. NETWORK (2014),
http://www.ushrnetwork.org/sites/ushrnetwork.org/files/10_steps-uprstakeholder-handout-advforhr
.pdf.
23. How to Write an Effective Shadow Report, U.S. HUMAN RTs. NETWORK 2-15 (June 4,
2014), http://www.ushmetwork.org/sites/ushrnetwork.org/files/howtowrite-an effectiveshadow
report_-_cerd trainingcalljune_4.pdf.
24. See UN Human Rights Mechanisms Calendar, U.S. HUMAN RTS. NETWORK (2014),
http://www.ushmetwork.org/sites/ushrnetwork.org/files/ushm un human-rights-mechanismscalendar
2.pdf; Government Consultations, U.S. HUMAN RTS. NETWORK, http://www.ushmetwork.org
/events/government-consultations (last visited Dec. 4, 2014).
25. Tentative Geneva Schedule, U.S. HUMAN RTS. NETWORK, http://www.ushmetwork.org
/sites/ushmetwork.org/files/cerd-geneva-schedule-august 2014-subject-to-change.pdf (last visited
Dec. 4, 2014).
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little if any coverage to the proceedings or to comparisons of the process's
outcomes with those of prior years. There is reason, however, to believe that
CSOs made a meaningful impact. During the CERD review cycle, forty-six
26shadow reports were submitted through the Taskforce. This figure constitutes
a 27.8% increase from the thirty-six reports submitted through the Taskforce
during the 2008 review cycle.27 Moreover, many recommendations found in
CERD's Concluding Observations 28 offered suggestions for continuing reform,
reflecting concrete proposals suggested in shadow reports, such as the need for
a state-federal coordinating mechanism for CERD implementation. 29 However,
many recommendations are framed at a level of generality such that it is
difficult to determine the degree to which they reflect CSO input. CERD
pointedly recommended that the United States "continue consulting and
expanding its dialogue with [CSOs] working in the area of human rights
protection, in particular in combating racial discrimination, in connection with
the preparation of the next periodic report and the follow-up to these
concluding observations."
30
Three months after CERD review concluded, CSOs weighed in on the
United States' periodic review under the Convention Against Torture, 31 again
32highlighting American shortcomings. A campaign to influence the UnitedStte'UnvrslPeidi3eve 34States' Universal Periodic Review in 2015 is underway. The Taskforce's
apparent success in mobilizing and coordinating CSOs' engagement with
CERD review suggests the continuing potency of this approach not only with
respect to future CERD review cycles, but potentially many other domains of
human rights monitoring as well.
26. CERD Shadow Reports, U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS NETWORK, http://www.ushmetwork.org
/resources-media/cerd-shadow-reports (last visited Dec. 4, 2014).
27. ICERD Newsletter One: 2008 ICERD Shadow Reports Compilation, U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS
NETWORK, http://www.ushmetwork.org/news-updates/icerd-newsletter-one-2008-icerd-shadow-reports-
compilation (last visited Dec. 4, 2014).
28. Concluding Observations on the Combined Seventh to Ninth Periodic Reports of United
States of America, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/USA/CO/7-9, at 13 (Aug. 29, 2014, 85th CERD session
document) [hereinafter Concluding Observations].
29. Id at 2-3; see also LAWYERS' COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW, U.S. FEDERALISM
AND ITS IMPACT ON ICERD COMPLIANCE 5 (2014).
30. Concluding Observations, supra note 28, at 13.
31. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 113; S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20
(1988).
32. CAT Shadow Reports, U.S. HUMAN RTS. NETWORK (last visited Dec. 4, 2014),
http://www.ushmetwork.org/cat-shadow-reports.
33. See G.A. Res. 60/251, 1 5(e), U.N. Doc. AIRES/60/251 (Mar. 15, 2006).
34. UPR: Universal Periodic Review, U.S. HUMAN RTS. NETWORK, http://www.ushmetwork
.org/our-work/project/upr-universal-periodic-review (last visited Dec. 4, 2014).
